

NATIONAL GUARD)  
HMH-463, MAG-24 , 1ST MAW  
HMH-363, MAG-24 , 1ST MAW  
HMH-466, MAG 16, 3D MAW  
HMH-361, MAG-16, 3D MAW  
HMH-465, MAG-16, 3D MAW  
DET, VMGR-252, MAG 14, 2D MAW  
DET, VMGR-352, MAG 11, 3D MAW  
MACG-38 (-)(REIN)  
VMU-1, MACG-38, 3D MAW  
VMU-2, MACG-28, 2D MAW  
MTACS-38, 3D MAW  
MASS-3, 3D MAW  
DET ASE, MASS-3, 3D MAW  
DET, DASC, MASS-3, 3D MAW  
DET, ASLT, MASS-3, 3D MAW  
DET, JSTARS, MASS-3, 3D MAW  
MWCS-38, 3D MAW  
CO A, MWCS-38, MACG-38, 3D MAW  
CO A, MWCS-28, MACG-28, 2D MAW  
CO B, MWCS-38, MACG-38, 3D MAW  
CO B, MWCS-28, MACG-28, 2D MAW  
MACS-1 (-) (REIN), 3D MAW  
DET, IFR/PAR ATC, MACS-1, MACG-38, 3D MAW  
DET, IFR/PAR ATC, MACS-2, MACG-28, 2D MAW  
DET, MMT, MACS-1, MACG-38, 3D MAW (AL TAQADDUM)  
DET, MMT, MACS-1, MACG-38, 3D MAW (AL ASAD)  
DET, MMT, MACS-1, MACG-38, 3D MAW (KOREAN VILLAGE)  
DET, MMT, MACS-1, MACG-38, 3D MAW (AL QAIM)  
DET, MMT, MACS-2, MACG-28, 2D MAW  
MWSS-37 (-) (REIN), 3D MAW  
MWSS-273, MWSS-27, 2D MAW  
MWSS-373, MWSS-37, 3D MAW  
MWSS-274, MWSS-27, 2D MAW  
MWSS-374, MWSS-37, 3D MAW  
PROVISIONAL SECURITY BN, AL ASAD SECURITY FORCE  
TF 1-109 (AL ASAD SECURITY FORCE) (U.S. ARMY)  
MACS-1(-) (REIN) (AL ASAD SECURITY FORCE)  
P CO, 5TH BN, 15TH MAR, MP DET (AL ASAD SECURITY  
FORCE)  
MWHS-3 BAND, SECURITY DET (AL ASAD SECURITY  
FORCE)  
MALS-11, SECURITY DET (AL ASAD SECURITY FORCE)  
MALS-13, SECURITY DET (AL ASAD SECURITY FORCE)  
MALS-39, SECURITY DET (AL ASAD SECURITY FORCE)  
MAG-16, SECURITY DET (AL ASAD SECURITY FORCE)  
3D LAAD BN, MACG-38, 3D MAW (AL ASAD SECURITY  
FORCE)  
67TH AREA SUPPORT GROUP (U.S. ARMY) (AL ASAD)  
226TH AREA SUPPORT GROUP (U.S. ARMY NATIONAL  
GUARD) (AL ASAD)  
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTS

CPL DANIEL ALVERSON XXX-XX-0570 USMC  
SGT TERRANCE BAILEY XXX-XX-8835 USMC  
LCPL BELEN BARRAZA XXX-XX-5030 USMC  
CDR DANIEL BASCOLA XXX-XX-6707 USN  
CDR KENNETH BRANHAM XXX-XX-3023 USN  
LT GRETCHEN BUNDY-LADOWICZ XXX-XX-1750 USN  
FLTLDANIEL CASSILLES XXX-XX-2705 ROYAL  
CPT SHAWN COIL XXX-XX-4082 USA  
CDR RICHARD COX XXX-XX-9304 USN  
AW2 CHARLES DAVIS XXX-XX-6407 USN  
HM3 RYAN FLOWER XXX-XX-5890 USN  
LT TRINA GATES XXX-XX-8571 USN  
LCDR STEPHEN GAZE XXX-XX-0726 USN  
SGT ERIC GEISLER XXX-XX-6759 USMC  
LT JOSHUA GLENN XXX-XX-9528 USN  
CDR OBRA GRAY XXX-XX-2858 USN  
HM2 ANTHONY GREGG XXX-XX-2458 USN  
LT IVORIQUE HAMBRICK XXX-XX-8633 USN  
HM2 KATI IVEY XXX-XXX-7089 USN  
CDR PAUL KADOWAKI XXX-XX-5176 USN  
CDR WILLIAM LITTLE XXX-XX-4291 USN  
LCDR PAUL MARTZ XXX-XX-5330 USN  
CDR THOMAS MAYHEW XXX-XX-2346 USN  
CDR VAN MCKENNY XXX-XX-4703 USN  
LCDR CYNTHIA MCKENZIE XXX-XX-8674 USN  
LT BRIAN MEYER XXX-XX-2857 USN  
CDR PETER MILHAM XXX-XX-9138 USN  
LTJG TROY MOONEN XXX-XX-1427 USN  
SGT JEFFERY NORTHCOTT XXX-XX-5182 USMC  
LT PETER OLSEN XXX-XX-6871 USN  
CDR THOMAS ORIELLY XXX-XX-9580 USN  
CDR RORY RIEGER XXX-XX-3213 USN  
SGT BRADLEY ROETHER XXX-XX-5519 USMC  
HM3 JUAN SEVILLA XXX-XX-9996 USN  
SGT JOSE SILVA XXX-XX-2843 USMC  
CPL JACK SPANGLER XXX-XX-3242 USMC  
LCDR DAVID STORR XXX-XX-9391 USN  
2NDLT SHEENIA STUART XXX-XX-6182 USMC  
RP1 DAVID THOMPSON XXX-XX-7400 USN  
CPL CLIFFORD WALTON XXX-XX-5039 USMC  
SSGT PAUL WHELAN XXX-XX-3423 USMC  
MAJ DAVID YECK XXX-XX-1275 USMC

1ST MARINE LOGISTICS GROUP (FWD) (REIN)

H&S CO (-) (REIN), CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
DET, HQ CO, CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
DET, 4TH MLG (FWD) WEST  
DET, GCAC, HQSVC BN, 2D MLG, II MEF  
DET, POSTAL, SVC CO, CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
DET, POSTAL, H&SBN, 3D MLG, III MEF  
DET, POSTAL, SVC CO, CLR-27, 2D MLG  
DET, PX, CLR-17 (TQ)  
DET, PX, MARCORINSTWEST  
DET, PX, MARCORINSTEAST

DET, DISBURSING, SVC CO, CLR-17  
DET, FOOD SERVICES CO, CLR-17

10 OF 15

AUST AIR FORCE

DET, LSSS, SVC CO, CLR-17  
PROV SCTY PLT, CLR-15, 1ST MLG  
PLT (-), PRPC, 4TH MLG, MFR  
EOD CO (-) (REIN) (8X TMS)  
HQ PLT (REIN), 1ST MLG  
PLT, PROV SCTY, 1ST MLG  
EOD TM, ENGR SPT CO, 7TH ESB, 1ST MLG  
EOD TM, ENGR SPT CO, 8TH ESB, 2ND MLG, II MEF  
EOD TM, ENGR SPT CO, 9TH ESB, 3RD MLG, III MEF  
EOD TM, DET, I MEF  
EOD TM, DET, III MEF  
EODMU 2 DET 20 (U.S. NAVY)  
EODMU 2 DET 4 (U.S. NAVY)  
EODMU 5 DET 7 (U.S. NAVY)  
COMM CO (-) (REIN), CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
DET, COMM, MFR  
DET, COMM, II MEF  
DET, COMM CO, III MHG, III MEF  
DET, COMM CO, 2D MLG, II MEF  
CLB 5, 1ST MLG (FWD) (OIF 05.07-1)  
HQ CO (-) (REIN), 7TH ESB, 1ST MLG  
SUP CO, 1ST SUP BUN, CLR-15  
DET, COMM, 1ST MLG  
DET, COMM CO, 3D MLG, III MEF  
DET, COMM, 2D MAW, II MEF  
DET, POSTAL, SVC CO, H&S BN, 1ST MLG  
DET, POSTAL, 3D MLG, III MEF  
DET, PX, SVC CO, H&S BN, 1ST MLG  
DET, AMMO CO (BLAHA), 1ST MLG  
DET, DISBURSING, BSSG-1, 1ST MLG  
DET, PRPC, 4TH MLG, MFR  
DET, FOOD SERVICES CO, BSSG-1, 1ST MLG  
PROV SECURITY CO, CLB-5, 1ST MLG  
SCTY PLT, CLB-5, 1ST MLG  
4TH PLT, CO B (-), 2D MP BN, 2D FSSG, II MEF  
CLC-115, CLB-5, 1ST MLG (FWD)  
CLC-115 (-) (MT CO), CSSB-1, 1ST MLG  
HQ PLT, CSSC-115 (-) (MT CO), CSSB-1, 1ST MLG  
MT PLT, DS MT CO, 3D TSB, 3D MLG, III MEF  
DET, LS CO, 4TH LSB, 4TH MLG, MFR  
CLC-155, CLB-5, 1ST MLG (FWD)  
CLC-155 (-) (REIN), 1ST MAINT BN, 1ST MLG  
DET IMA, 2D MLG, II MEF  
DET IMA, 3D MLG, III MEF  
PLT, ORG MAINT, CLB-5, 1ST MLG  
ENGINEER CO, CLB-5, 1ST MLG (FWD)  
DET, ENG CO (-) REIN, 7TH ESB, 1ST MLG  
DET, ENGR SPT CO, 7TH ENGR SPT BN, 1ST MLG  
PLT, CO C, 7TH ENGR SPT BN, 1ST MLG

DET, BF PLT, 7TH ENGR SPT BN, 1ST MLG  
SURG CO C (-) (REIN), 1ST MED BN, 1ST MLG (FALLUJAH)  
DET, S/STP, FRSS/STP, 1ST MED BN, 1ST MLG  
(TAQADDUM)  
DET, FRSS, 1ST MED BN, (RAMADI)  
DET, DENTAL, 1ST DENTAL BN (FALLUJAH)  
DET, DENTAL, 1ST DENTAL BN (TAQADDUM)  
CLB-7 (-) (REIN), 1ST MLG (OIF 05.07-1)  
HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE CO, CLB-7, 1ST MLG (FWD)

11OF 15

HQ co (-), CLB-7, 1ST MLG  
DET, COMM CO, 3RD MLG  
DET, COMM CO, 3D MARDIV, III MEF  
DET, COMM CO, III MHG, III MEF  
DET, COMM CO, 3RD MLG, III MEF  
DET, COMM CO, 2D MAW, II MEF  
DET, POSTAL, 3RD MLG, III MEF  
DET, POSTAL, BSSG-1, 1ST MLG  
DET, POSTAL, 2D MLG, II MEF  
DET, PX, BSSG-1, 1ST MLG  
DET, AMMO CO, 1ST MLG  
DET, DISBURSING, 1ST MLG  
DET, PRPC, 4TH MLG, MFR  
DET, FOOD SERVICES CO, BSSG-1, 1ST MLG  
PROV SCTY CO, CLB-7, 1ST MLG  
PLT, MP CO, MP BN, 2 MLG  
SCTY PLT, 3D MLG, III MEF  
SCTY PLT, CLB-7, 1ST MLG  
SCTY PLT, CLB-7, 1ST MLG  
2D PLT, CO B (-), 2D MP BN, 2D FSSG, II MEF  
CLC-117 (REIN), CLB-7, 1ST MLG  
HQ PLT, CLC-117 (REIN), CLB-7, 1ST MLG  
MT PLT, CLC-117, CLB-7, 1ST MLG  
MT PLT, CLC-117, CLB-7, 1ST MLG  
MT PLT, DS MT CO, 3D TSB, 3D MLG, III MEF  
MT PLT, DS MT CO, 3D TSB, 3D MLG, III MEF  
DET, LS CO, 4TH MLG, MFR  
DET, AD, 1ST MLG  
ENGR CO (-), 7TH ENGR SPT BN, 1ST MLG  
DET, BF PLT, 7TH ENGR SPT BN, 1ST MLG  
DET, ENGR SPT CO, 7TH ENGR SPT BN, 1ST MLG  
DET, UTILITIES, 7TH ESB, 1ST MLG  
IMA CO 157 (-) (REIN), CSSG-15, 1ST MLG  
DET, ORD MAINT CO, 3D MAT READ BN, 3D MLG, III MEF  
DET, ORD MAINT CO, 2D MAT READ BN, 2D MLG, II MEF  
DET, ENGR MAINT CO, 3D MAT READ BN, 3D MLG, III MEF  
DET, MT MAINT CO, 3D MAT READ BN, 3D MLG, III MEF  
DET, ELMACO, 3D MATERIAL READINESS BN, 3D MLG, III  
MEF  
SURG CO A (-), 1ST MED BN, 1ST MLG (AL ASAD)  
DET, FRSS/STP, 1ST MED BN, 1ST MLG (AL QAIM)  
DET, FRSS/STP, 1ST MED BN, 1ST MLG (KOREAN VILLAGE)  
DET, DENTAL, 1ST DENTAL BN (AL ASAD)

DET, DENTAL, 1ST DENTAL BN (AL QAIM)  
DET, DENTAL, 1ST DENTAL BN (KOREAN VILLAGE)  
CLB-5 (-) (REIN), 4TH MLG, MFR (OIF 05.07-2)  
HQ CO (-) (REIN), CLB-5, 1ST MLG  
DET, POSTAL, CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
DET, PX, CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
DET, AMMO CO, 1ST SUP BN, CLR-15  
DET, DISBURSING, SVC CO, CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
DET, PRPC, 4TH MLG, MFR  
DET, FOOD SERVICES CO, CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
PROV SCTY CO, CLB-5, 1ST MLG  
PLT, MP CO, CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
PROV SCTY PLT 1, CLB-7, 1ST MLG  
PROV SCTY PLT 2, CLB-7, 1ST MLG  
MT CO (-) (REIN), CLB-5, 1ST MLG

12 OF 15

HQ PLT, DET, II MEF  
DET, LS CO, CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
MT PLT, DET II MEF  
MT PLT, DET III MEF  
MT PLT, DET, 4TH MAW, MFR  
ENG CO (-) (REIN), 7TH ESB, 1ST MLG  
PLT, CO A, 7TH ESB  
DET, UTILITIES, ENGR SPT CO, 7TH ESB  
DET, ENGR SPT PLT, CO A, 7TH ESB  
BULK FUEL PLT, CO A, 7TH ESB  
GSM CO (-) (REIN), CLB-5, 1ST MLG  
HQ PLT, GSM CO, 1ST MAINT BN, CLR-15, 1ST MLG  
PLT, GSM CO, 1ST MAINT BN  
PLT, ORGANIZATIONAL MAINT, CLB-5, 1ST MLG  
DET, SURG CO C (-) (REIN), 1ST MED BN, 1ST MLG  
FRSS (REIN), 1ST MED BN  
STP, 1ST MED BN  
DET, DENTAL, 1ST DENTAL BN, 1ST MLG  
DET, COMBAT STRESS TEAM, 1ST MED BN  
CLB-1 (-) (REIN), 1ST MLG (OIF 05.07-2)  
HQ CO (-) (REIN), CLB-1, 1ST MLG  
DET, POSTAL, 1ST MLG  
DET, PX, SVC CO, CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
DET, AMMO CO, 1ST SUP BN, CLR-15, 1ST MLG  
DET, DISBURSING, SVC CO, CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
DET, FOOD SERVICES CO, CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
DET, PLT, PRPC, 4TH MLG  
PROV SCTY CO, CLB-1, 1ST MLG  
HQ PLT, CLB-1, 1ST MLG  
PLT, PROV SCTY CO, 7TH ESB, 1ST MLG  
PROV MP PLT, BTRY A, 1/10 MAR, 2D MARDIV, II MEF  
MT CO (REIN), CLB-1, 1ST MLG  
HQ PLT, CLC-111, CLB-1, 1ST MLG  
MT PLT, CLB-1, 1ST MLG  
DET, LS CO, 3RD TSB, 3RD MLG  
DET, LS CO, CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
DET, SPT CO, CLB-1, 1ST MLG  
ENG CO (-) (REIN), 7TH ESB, 1ST MLG

PLT, CO A (-), 7TH ESB  
DET, BF CO, 9TH ESB, 3RD MLG  
PLT, ENGR SPT CO, 7TH ESB  
DET, UTILITIES, ENGR SPT CO, 7TH ESB  
GSM CO (-) (REIN), CLB-1, 1ST MLG  
DET, HQ CO, CLC-16, CLR-15, 1ST MLG  
DET, ORD MAINT CO, 3RD MRB, 3RD MLG  
DET, ELMACO, 3RD MRB, 3RD MLG  
DET, ENGR MAINT CO, 3RD MRB, 3RD MLG  
PLT, MT MAINT CO, 3RD MRB, 3RD MLG  
DET, SURG CO C (-) (REIN), 1ST MED BN, 1ST MLG  
FRSS, 1ST MED BN, 1ST MLG  
DET, STP, 1ST MED BN, 1ST MLG  
STP, 1ST MED BN, 1ST MLG  
DET, 1ST DENTAL BN, 1ST MLG  
DET, COMBAT STRESS TEAM, 1ST MED BN  
CLR-15 FWD (-) (REIN), 1ST MLG  
HQ CO (-), CLR 15, 1ST MLG  
GS MT CO, 1ST MLG

13OF 15

HQ PLT, 1ST MLG  
MT PLT, 1ST MLG  
MT PLT, 6TH MT BN, 4TH MLG  
DET, LS CO, CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
DET, LS CO, CLR-17, 1ST MLG  
DET, MHE, 6TH ESB, 4TH MLG  
PROV MP CO, CLR-15, 1ST MLG  
HQ PLT, BTRY A, 1/10, 2D MARDIV, II MEF  
PROV MP PLT, BTRY A, 1/10, 2D MARDIV  
PROV SCTY PLT, CLR-15, 1ST MLG  
REPAIRABLE MAINT CO (-) (REIN), CLR-15, 1ST MLG  
DET, MHE, 6TH ESB, 4TH MLG .  
DET, REPAIRABLE ISSUE POINT, CLR-15  
DET, REPAIRABLE ISSUE POINT, CLR-15  
SUPPLY COMPANY (REIN) 1ST SUP BN, 1ST MLG  
DET, MEDLOG CO, 1ST SUP BN, 1ST MLG  
DET, MDC, 1ST SUP BN, CLR-15, 1ST MLG  
DET, MDC, 1ST SUP BN, CLR-15, 1ST MLG  
DET, AMMO CO, 1ST SUP BN, CLR-15  
SURG CO CO (-) (REIN), 1ST MED BN, CLR-15  
FRSS, 1ST MED BN  
STP, 1ST MED BN  
FRSS (REIN), 1ST MED BN  
STP, 1ST MED BN  
DET, COMBAT STRESS TEAM, 1ST MED BN,  
DET, 1 ST DENTAL BN  
CLC-115 (-) (REIN), CLR-15  
DET, HQ CO, CLR-15  
DET, MT CO, CLR-15  
DET, PROV MP CO, CLR-15  
DET, UTILITIES, CLB-5  
DET, SVCS, CLB-5  
FRSS, 1ST MED BN  
9TH ENGINEER SUPPORT BN (FWD) (TACON TO NCR)

H&S CO (-), 9TH ESB, 3RD MLG  
PROV SCTY CO (-), 9TH ESB, 3RD MLG  
B CO, 6TH ESB, 4TH MLG  
ENGR SPT CO (-), 9TH ESB, 3RD MLG  
2-136TH (CAB) (ARMY NATIONAL GUARD)

30THNAVALCONSTRUCTIONREGT (-)(REIN)(U.S.NAVY)  
46TH ENG BN (U.S. ARMY)  
CO, 913TH EN CO CSE (U.S. ARMY)  
NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BN 133 (U.S. NAVY)  
84TH ENG CONST BN  
NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BN 22 (U.S. NAVY)

9TH NAVAL CONSTRUCTION REGT (-)(REIN) (U.S. NAVY)  
NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BN 25 (U.S. NAVY)  
NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BN 40 (U.S. NAVY)

3RDNAVALCONSTRUCTIONREGT (-)(REIN)(U.S.NAVY)  
NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BN 18 (U.S. NAVY)  
NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BN 74 (U.S. NAVY)  
9TH ENGINEER SUPPORT BN  
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTS  
CDR FRANCISCO ALONSO XXX-XX-2443 USN

14OF 15

LCDR KRISTIAN BARTON XXX-XX-8838 USN  
LCDR GUILFORD MOORING XXX-XX-1142 USN  
CDR CARLTONN PACE XXX-XX-4695 USN  
CDR THOMAS REEVES XXX-XX-6944 USN  
CDR NOEL RUSSNOGLE XXX-XX-6456 USN  
CDR BRIAN SWEET XXX-XX-8486 USN  
CDR BRIAN VINCENT XXX-XX-6711 USN  
CDR ERNST WALGE XXX-XX-0727 USN  
GYSGT CHRYSTAL HENDERSON XXX-XX-2223 USMC  
MSGT ROGER MULNIX XXX-XX-2231 USMC

15TH MEU (SOC) , COMMANDELEMENT  
DET, 1ST INTEL BN  
DET, 1ST RAD BN  
WX DET, MWSS-373  
DET, 9TH COMM BN  
2ND PLT, 1ST FORCE RECON CO  
POSTAL DET, 1ST MLG  
DISBURSING DET, 1ST MLG  
FOOD SERVICE DET, MWSS-371  
HMM-165 (REIN)  
DET, HMLA-267  
DET, HMH-465  
DET, MACG-38  
DET, MAG-16  
DET, MALS-13

DET, MALS-16  
DET, MALS-39  
DET, MWSS-371  
DET, VMA-311  
CLB-15  
DET, EENGINEER  
DET, COMM  
DET, HEALTH SERVICES  
DET, MAINT  
DET, SUPPLY  
DET, TS  
DET, MP  
DET, HQ  
BLT 2/4  
HQSVC CO 2/4  
WPNS CO 2/4  
E CO 2/4  
F CO 2/4  
G CO 2/4  
3RD PLT, E CO, 3RD AA BN  
1ST PLT, D CO, 1ST TANK BN  
1ST PLT, A CO, 1ST LAR BN  
S BTRY, 5/11  
3RD PLT, A CO, 1ST CEB  
2ND PLT, A CO, 1ST RECON BN

#### ADDITIONAL AUGMENTS

AC2 STEVEN G. BRADER XXX-XX-7741 USN  
EOD1 JAMES M. NULL XXX-XX-1143 USN  
EOD2 CHRISTOPHER M. VONNEGUT XXX-XX-9819 USN  
AC2 NATHAN R. WOODLEE XXX-XX-3502 USN  
GYSGT JEREMY L. KULBERG XXX-XX-3575 USMC

By-name listing of civilians  
recommended for the award  
INTRODUCTION

In a battle space spanning more than 50,000 square miles, contested by a ruthless, violent insurgent enemy, the I MEF FWD transformed the future prospects of the Anbar Province of Iraq. Through the heroic efforts of its forces, it enhanced stability, rapidly expanded the size and effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces and set the conditions for improved self-governance and economic growth. This multinational force of more than 33,000 men and women redefined the concept of valor to meet the unique demands of counterinsurgency operations in the 21st Century: combining selfless courage in the face of a lethal enemy with unprecedented restraint, wisdom, and military effectiveness. I MEF FWD affected a turning point in the province's future through bold and daring leadership and a proactive personal diplomacy that balanced knowledge and respect for Iraq's long tribal past with thoughtful mentorship of democracy and the rule of law.

#### NEW VALOR

The most powerful argument that can be made for awarding the Navy Unit Commendation to the I MEF FWD is the persistent heroism of its Marines, Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen throughout a grueling year of operations in the most dangerous province in Iraq. Putting this widespread heroism into context requires a re-examination of many traditional concepts of battlefield heroism in the light of counterinsurgency warfare. In past wars, roles were more clearly defined. The enemy wore uniforms, bore arms openly and



engaged forces in direct combat. The battle zone and rear areas were most often well-defined and the brunt of nearly all combat was born by those who were formally trained in combat arms. Today, many of these accepted norms have been shredded by an enemy who makes no distinction between civilian and combatant, and who has no regard for international law of war. Logistics convoys, support areas and civil works projects were as likely as traditional maneuver forces to be targeted by the insurgent enemy. Regardless of service, mission or occupational specialty, the troops of I MEF FWD responded magnificently to this challenge.

Valor, the strength of mind or spirit that enables a person to encounter danger with firmness, was in no short supply across the vast operating area of Al Anbar. In an environment where no mission was routine, I MEF FWD met daunting challenges with firmness on a daily basis. In many ways, the nature of counterinsurgency warfare has minimized the frequency and effectiveness of the decisive military engagement that typically accompanies our standard definition of battlefield heroism. An enemy who refuses to stand and fight but relies instead on acts of terror and murder robs our modern forces of the opportunity to demonstrate their valor in the traditional sense. The nature of combat operations in the Long War makes the modern battlefield no less dangerous. 308 men and women killed in action and 3134 wounded are proof that violence at the hands of the enemy was a real and constant threat in Al Anbar Province during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 05-07. The manner in which the Marines, Sailors, Soldiers, and Airmen responded to this incessant danger was absolutely heroic. Not only was heroism evident in their willingness to put themselves in harm's way day after day, but doubly heroic because they often accepted increased risk in order to protect the innocent. By stringently abiding by rules of engagement, carefully employing escalation of force procedures and demonstrating the courage and self-discipline to establish positive identification before engaging, they saved countless Iraqi lives and advanced the cause of the United States of America in the Global War on Terror. When facing an enemy who deliberately attacks from among the innocent to provoke a devastating response, selfless valor and restraint are the greatest weapons on the battlefield. The wisdom, courage and diplomacy exhibited by the forces of I MEF FWD on a daily basis had a strategic impact in advancing our nation's goals in a complex counterinsurgency operation.

This exceptional valor was not limited to combat arms personnel alone. From combat re-supply convoys to the transportation of personnel around the area of operations, the nature of insurgent targeting and the ideology of insurgency made every mission a potential target. Support personnel responded courageously to calls for drivers and gunners on convoys. Clerks and technicians joined Personal Security Details and Quick Reaction Forces. Headquarters personnel took over local security duties to free maneuver unit troops to patrol. Female Marines volunteered for the Lioness Program, where they have served among the local populace in dangerous locales as searchers to interact with Iraqi women. Thousands of these support personnel took on new roles in harm's way to enable many thousands more in combat arms billets to do the grass-roots work of counterinsurgency every day.

#### SITUATION/CHALLENGES

To comprehend the magnitude of what the Force's troops have accomplished during the past year, a sound understanding of the operating environment is required. I MEF FWD assumed control of the Multi National Force-West area of operations on 28 February 2006. The Area of Operations comprised one third of the entire country of Iraq; nearly the size of North Carolina. This westernmost Province is the most sparsely populated and the least civilized in Iraq. Its terrain is primarily undeveloped desert land with isolated tribal villages in the far west while 95% of its 1.7 million people live within 5 miles of the Euphrates River Valley. With less than 6 inches of rainfall during the year and temperatures reaching 120 degrees during the hottest summer months, the weather itself was an obstacle to coalition forces.

The foremost challenge to the mission was the brutality and relentlessness of the insurgency. Al Anbar Province was home to the majority of the insurgent population in all of Iraq and insurgent forces were estimated to be in control of nearly 70% of the Area of Operations at the start of 2006. Even in areas of recent coalition success, insurgents thwarted progress by mounting attacks from locations close by. Successful Provincial Elections in late 2005 were soon undermined by a vicious murder and intimidation

campaign which killed some leaders and drove others into exile. Among members of the Provincial Government, the survivors of these murder and intimidation campaigns were forced to meet in Baghdad for their own safety. Previous operations had killed off many insurgents, but those who remained were typically among the most capable, ruthless and skillful in the art of terror.

What was already a complex economy of force operation became infinitely more so after the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra in February 2006. This caused the forces of I MEF FWD to be reassigned to Baghdad to quell the rapidly escalating sectarian violence, spreading the forces of I MEF FWD even thinner than before. Distrust and growing unrest between Sunni and Shi'a complicated prospects for much-needed central government support for Al Anbar at the ministerial level. Reduced economic prospects served only to enhance the recruiting appeal of the insurgency, which offered cash for violence. I MEF FWD faced many of these challenges alone, with initially fewer than 2,000 Iraqi police on duty across the province and two undermanned divisions of the Iraqi Army being built and trained in the midst of combat.

#### DECISIONS/ACTIONS OF I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO TRANSFORM THE BATTLE SPACE AND SET CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS

The leadership of I MEF FWD affected a dramatic improvement in this challenging environment as they carried out a series of bold, creative and timely initiatives. Their willingness to adopt unconventional tactics and take calculated risks was a critical component in overcoming a devious enemy. Decisions to selectively divide forces to impact multiple areas simultaneously and the employment of company- and platoon-sized elements in small combat outposts in critical areas, remote from battalion bases, effectively took the fight to the enemy across the area of operations. The ultimate result of these dynamic decisions and stalwart acceptance of operational risk was success in a complex counterinsurgency operation. This success, despite its context as an economy of force effort, has set the stage for improved security, increased self-governance, and economic growth.

Planners moved quickly to exploit the success of OPERATION STEEL CURTAIN that was carried out by II Marine Expeditionary Force during the fall of 2005. As with the successful kinetic AL FAJR operation in Fallujah during 2004, overwhelming combat power had been used to clear an area of insurgent forces. In order to maximize the gains realized after the operation, effective counterinsurgency techniques were required. The Marines of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines reached out to leaders of the dominant Abu Mahal tribe, who saw the benefits of cooperation with coalition forces for their local security and economy. This successful engagement of local leaders continued under 3d Battalion, 4th Marines with similar results. With the encouragement of tribal leaders, young men signed up for the police in record numbers, building the force from virtual nonexistence to one with 1500 officers that has become a model throughout Iraq.

The concept of "clear, hold, build" that was successfully demonstrated in Al Qaim became the model across Al Anbar and the goal for controlling of Baghdad. The effectiveness of isolating communities after clearing out insurgents was demonstrated in Fallujah as barriers, entry control points and biometric technology were used to systematically separate insurgents from the general populace. Understanding that successful counterinsurgency relies upon the ability of forces to identify their adversary, Regimental Combat Team 5 employed a combination of high technology and human means to accomplish this goal. BATS (Biometrics Automated Tool Set) machines were used to register citizens and generate universal city-wide identification cards that allowed residents to be screened as they came and went from the city. Combined operations with local police and Iraqi Army forces that were more familiar with the civilian population, a concept referred to as "Team Fallujah," further stripped terrorists of their anonymity. Fallujah became known as the "gated community" of Al Anbar. While challenges remain, the fact that Fallujah has become a destination for thousands of refugees fleeing violence in Baghdad is a dramatic symbol of its transformation in the area of security.

In addition to effective population control in the city of Fallujah, the constantly shifting combat forces of Regimental Combat Team 5 demonstrated their tenacity and perseverance in the traversing of hundreds of thousands of miles in route clearance, the aggressive hunting and tracking of insurgents, and the discovery of numerous weapons caches throughout the city and outlying areas. The small cities, towns

and rural areas that stretch from Fallujah westward to Ramadi once offered unchallenged refuge to insurgents fleeing decisive operations in the Province's two largest cities. The dogged persistence of Regimental Combat Team 5 forces in applying effective counterinsurgency fundamentals steadily eroded the portion of the area available to shelter the enemy. Incessant foot patrols, census operations, the patient development of relations with local nationals, and the increasing effectiveness of combined operations with Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army units were all instrumental in stripping the enemy of large portions of an area he once relied upon to rest and refit.

Events in Ramadi thoroughly demonstrated the flexibility and initiative of I MEF FWD leaders. On 7 June 2006, when Abu Masab Al Zarqawi was killed in an air strike, intelligence officers advised that a small window of opportunity existed to make a powerful impact in the Ramadi area by denying Anti-Iraqi Forces their goal of turning it into the capital of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Tapping into the extensive combat power of the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division, major operations began on 17 June 2006 that were designed to cause maximum impact on Anti-Iraqi Forces while minimizing hardship on the civilian population. From the beginning of the campaign the Information Operation plan centered itself on winning over the people of Ramadi. A central component of the plan was the rapid seizure of key combat outposts first on the periphery, then in the center of the city to decisively enhance security in critical areas. Hundreds of tons of material and equipment were massed, palletized and moved with internal lift assets to rapidly emplace barriers, wire and life support within six hours of the initial seizure of key terrain. In just four days, the Ready First Combat team began the process of disrupting Anti-Iraqi Forces' freedom of maneuver and heroically overcame the enemy's desperate will to maintain their malicious grip on the city. In the following weeks, three maneuver battalions conducted six battalion-sized operations to establish six new combat outposts and reopen the Ramadi General Hospital, which had been seized by Anti-Iraqi Forces for use as their headquarters in the city. Thirty-four days of brave fighting and courageous efforts by Soldiers, Sailors and Marines along with Iraqi Security Forces effectively isolated Ramadi and the set stage for subsequent operations.

The successful "clear, hold, build" method was modified to suit the unique geography and operational situation of Ramadi at the conclusion of major operations to isolate the city. In addition to using berms and wire, existing obstacles such as railroad tracks and rivers were used to control the population, and a bold adaptation referred to as "inkblots" was employed. Small combat outposts were built, hardened and defended by coalition forces in the worst areas of the city. Their proximity to trouble spots allowed rapid response to insurgent activity. As security was improved, Iraqi Security Forces were introduced, allowing for combined patrols that enhanced effectiveness. As insurgents were targeted and detained, confidence among the local populace grew into a relationship that yielded tips to further enhance operations. As Iraqi Security Forces gained control, coalition forces moved on to establish the next combat outpost. Due to the success of this innovative strategy in bolstering security, the police force grew from under 300 to nearly 3000 assigned and the number of police stations grew from two to 16 over the course of six months.

A key to the success in the Ramadi area was the ability of I MEF FWD to recognize, tap into and support the Sahawat Al Anbar, or National Awakening Council led by Sheik Sittar, chief of the Abu Resha Tribe. As they had done in Al Qaim, coalition leaders successfully engaged a network of traditional tribal leaders in the Ramadi area. This engagement had numerous positive effects, most notably the increased rate of Iraqi Police recruitment. Leaders demonstrated flexibility and an understanding of local concerns, negotiating an effective strategy which allowed one cohort of recruits to attend police training while others remained behind to defend their neighborhoods against Anti-Iraqi Forces attacks. This approach not only bolstered local security in the short term but led to a dramatic increase in trust, cooperation and human intelligence in the long term. A final component of these successful operations in Ramadi was the effective cooperation between coalition and Iraqi forces, which enhanced confidence and effectiveness in the Iraqi Security Forces.

The success of the "clear, hold, build" strategy was systematically replicated up the Euphrates River Valley in Hit, the "triad" cities of Haditha, Hacliniyah and Barwanah as well as Rawah and Anah to the north. In each area the formula of bold planning, innovative application of counterinsurgency principles, and disciplined tactical execution by the troops was a winning combination.

In Hit, coalition forces were also able to successfully build relations with sheiks and other local leaders. These relations led to the development of a 900 man police force in Hit and the surrounding area; a force which had grown in capabilities to the point where it could take the lead in anti-insurgent operations by February 2007. As stability and security improved, civil affairs Marines were able to partner successfully with local leaders and contractors to undertake numerous projects, including road repairs and school renovations to benefit the local populace.

Drawing on the significant counterinsurgency advantage of knowing the local populace, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines followed by 2d Battalion, 3d Marines worked closely with the local police to identify insurgents who blended easily into the local populace. Through engagement, interaction, and non-invasive presence, the unit overcame the broken relationships and lack of trust between coalition forces and the people of Haditha that resulted from the events of the previous two years. The Marines rebuilt cooperation and transformed Haditha in a matter of weeks from one of the most dangerous places in Iraq to one of increasing stability. Similar events unfolded across the river in Barwanah where the addition of three companies of combat power from Battalion Landing Team 2/4 of the 15th MEU SOC (Special Operations Capable) to the lone company already in place made a dramatic impact on the local security situation. Enhanced security quickly bolstered the confidence of local citizens in the coalition effort and led to dramatic increases in human intelligence. These tips combined with aggressive patrolling uncovered numerous weapons caches, severely disrupting enemy capabilities in the area.

The Sailors of the 3d and 9th Naval Construction Regiments played an invaluable role in security operations up and down the Euphrates River Valley, augmenting the organic engineering assets of local coalition forces to construct scores of miles of physical barriers and other obstacles. The "Sea Bees" were instrumental to the success of the "clear, hold, build" strategy, which could not have been undertaken without the physical security measures they created.

In yet another display of innovative thinking that contributed to success along the Euphrates River, the Dam Security Unit, manned primarily by Marines from Company B, 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion was given an additional tasking. In addition to their original mission of protecting the strategically vital dam at Haditha, they were tasked to become a broader resource as an interdiction force patrolling the Euphrates. This new tactic quickly paid dividends as the Dam Support Unit Marines uncovered over 60 weapons caches on islands and riverbanks, performed Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure operations on more than 700 Iraqi boats, interdicted Anti-Iraqi Forces' movement on the river, and generally denied the insurgents another area where they had once maneuvered freely. An added benefit of this new Dam Support Unit capability was providing commanders with an additional option for movement of forces around the hazardous operating area, to include covert insertion of forces. DSU-3 conducted operations over more than 430 kilometers of the Euphrates River from its bases at Haditha and Ramadi, supporting battalions throughout I MEF FWD with craft and organic ground combat element.

In the northern cities of Rawah and Anah, 3d and 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalions employed elements of the same basic tactics that were used successfully in other strategic locations throughout the province. The implementation of entry control points to control the movement of the population and establishment of a rigorous patrolling regimen quickly increased security and stability throughout the cities. The Marines of 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion demonstrated the same flexibility and mission oriented spirit that characterized all I MEF FWD operations throughout the year, often parking their Light Armored Vehicles to conduct foot mobile patrols for greater counterinsurgency impact as they moved among the local populace building relations and gradually establishing trust. They also integrated Iraqi Security Forces into their patrols, a tactic that dramatically increased their ability to separate insurgents from the local population.

The capstone of I MEF FWD's exceptionally effective operational plan was the decision to employ the theater reserve force of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU SOC) in Al Anbar Province and the bold manner in which its combat power was employed. As noted, the majority of Battalion Landing Team 2/4 was sent to Barwanah to impact that critical area, while two companies went to support operations in Ramadi by providing more foot mobile presence in the provincial capital.

The 15th MEU SOC command element, with a significantly reduced ground combat element, and its combat logistics battalion were deployed to Korean Village to impact the city of Rutbah, the Ports of Entry, Main Supply Route Mobile and a vast swath of western Al Anbar. Like the cities of the Euphrates that preceded it, Rutbah was bermed, entry control points were emplaced, and the 15th MEU SOC engaged in bold operations in spite of its numerically small ground combat element to shape the area for future success. They were able to introduce a permanent coalition presence and initiate the establishment of a police force in a municipality regarded by many as "lawless" during most of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Simultaneously, the 15th MEU SOC Command Element used every resource at its disposal to positively influence the remainder of the vast area under their charge. The mobility of their Light Armored Vehicles combined with Reconnaissance Marines and aviation surveillance and reconnaissance were leveraged to dramatically reduce improvised explosive device emplacements along Route Mobile. These same capabilities helped them to deny the enemy the unhindered use of western Al Anbar he had enjoyed just one year earlier.

The end result of the manner in which I MEF FWD employed its forces was an ever-changing, fluid application of combat power to counter enemy activity as well as mitigate the effects of force changes driven ultimately by events in Baghdad. The fact that I MEF FWD was able to effectively disrupt Anti-Iraqi Forces' activity and make dramatic progress in this challenging area of operations at a time when it was suffering a net loss of combat power due to reallocation of forces to locations outside of Al Anbar is exceptionally noteworthy and stands out as a singular achievement among those of all Coalition Forces in Iraq.

#### INNOVATION AND UNCOMMON DEDICATION

The I MEF FWD commanders and staff made creative and effective use of all of its manpower and resources to fight the insurgency through a series of bold initiatives involving assignment of battle space to nontraditional units, creative staffing of transition teams, technological innovation, and effective non-conventional use of air and logistical assets. The success of these initiatives effectively counter-balanced the impacts of shifting strategic priorities, force redistribution, and the challenges of fighting an insurgency with a conventional force.

##### (Manpower)

Refusing to be handicapped by the reassignment of forces outside of the Multi National Force-West Area of Operations after the shifting of priorities to Baghdad, I MEF FWD took an aggressive forward-leaning posture with regard to accomplishing the mission with fewer resources. Constantly doing more with less, leadership at all levels identified every place where non-conventional solutions could be applied. Continuing efforts to increase control of the battle space resulted in the assignment of areas of operation to non-traditional units including 3d and 4th Reconnaissance Battalions, the I Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward), and Assault Amphibian Battalions. The success of each of these units in controlling their assigned battle space was vital to countering the insurgent tactic of shifting into the safety of unguarded areas during decisive operations and returning at a time of their choosing. By using every internal manpower resource, I MEF FWD succeeded in positioning some form of combat power in every critical area, denying the insurgents many of the areas where they had previously operated unchallenged.

The importance of Iraqi Security Forces development was universally recognized and was the core of I MEF FWD mission. Force leadership immediately recognized the need for additional advisors to bring Iraqi Security Forces training to the level required for transfer to Iraqi Army Lead. Completely out of their existing personnel structure, I MEF FWD sourced seven 15-man Police Transition Teams, three 12-man Military Transition Teams, partially sourced three Army Border Transition Teams, and provided 229 augments to existing Military Transition Teams. This massive enhancement of the transition teams with more than 370 out-of-hide personnel was exceedingly successful due to the effective leadership and adaptability of both the reassigned personnel and the remaining personnel who stepped up to accept additional responsibilities.