

Subordinate Commanders understanding the critical importance of this mission also supplemented existing transition teams by reassigning Marines from within their own command often at great cost to their own organization. From the most junior private to the most senior officer, each member of I MEF FWD made a personal sacrifice and commitment, continually giving more to advance progress in the Anbar Province.

A key ingredient in the successful development and application of transition teams of all types was the commitment to assign personnel well in advance of deployment whenever feasible and the philosophy of training them as a team. Transition Teams conducted extensive pre-deployment training together in structured contexts such as Mohave Viper and in small-unit driven training designed by their own leaders. Teams built upon the lessons learned by their predecessors and developed unit cohesion and combat skills that would be essential to their success in Iraq.

#### (Technology)

In the aggressive pursuit of a solution to the persistent improvised explosive device threat, the I MEF FWD led the way in employing Electronic Countermeasure technology as standard equipment on its vehicles. As the effectiveness of anti radio controlled device technology improved, the enemy shifted tactics. By anticipating this shift, the Technology and Innovation Section was able to aggressively surpass the enemy's Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures cycle by relentlessly pursuing acquisition and implementation of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, promoting existing technology such as v-shaped hulls on battle field vehicles, and developing pragmatic solutions such as mine rollers. When the inherent complexities of the acquisition process would not allow implementation of these solutions as quickly as the tactical situation demanded, I MEF FWD pursued creative organic means to save lives through effective field-improvised solutions. Two distinct mine roller designs were developed by organic logisticians from I Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group and 1st Marine Logistics Group. The design from 1st Marine Logistics Group became the widely-used Albany Roller. The command push to create this simple, yet effective solution in response to the enemy's increasing use of victim detonated improvised explosive devices saved countless lives. Waiting for conventional sources to provide solutions equaled unacceptable losses on the battlefield, so the I MEF FWD staff responded with leadership and creativity to implement a near-term solution. Individually and collectively, the attitude throughout the Force was one of initiative, bias for action, and taking every available course of action in order to save lives and defeat the enemy.

The zealous pursuit of technology to save lives and defeat insurgents led to the generation of 101 Urgent Universal Need Statements and 25 Joint Universal Need Statements. The impact of these efforts is most clearly highlighted by the instant success of the Ground-Based Observation and Surveillance System which produced information leading to the capture or elimination of multiple improvised explosive device layers within the first weeks of operational use.

#### (Law Enforcement Capabilities)

In keeping with the United States goal to establish rule of law and demonstrate justice and fairness, the coalition role in the counterinsurgency fight shifted from overt warfare to tactics which increasingly resembled law enforcement techniques. One of the unintended consequences of this was a legal standard of evidence that Marines were not trained to collect. This shift led to a disturbing trend of potentially dangerous insurgents being released prematurely only to cause more mayhem on the battlefield. The desire to support the rule of law in Iraq and our application of law enforcement and criminal justice standards ill-suited for a war zone produced unintended consequences. Detainees caught bearing arms against coalition forces and innocent civilians were treated as suspects rather than enemy prisoners of war. Not only was the enemy gaining direct advantages from his violation of the law of war, he was gaining additional indirect advantages due to our strict adherence to these same laws.

To combat this corrosive trend, I MEF FWD leaders once again thought and acted outside the box, creating the battlefield equivalent of the district attorney's office, the Joint Prosecution and Exploitation Center. The purpose of this first ever of its kind organization was to coordinate, exploit, analyze, track,

and evaluate detainees and their captured material in order to increase the probability of a successful prosecution at the Central Criminal Court of Iraq or security hold by the Combined Review and Release Board. The Center also maximized further exploitation at the Joint Interrogation Detention Center and assisted in the development of target packages. This innovative capability had a direct and immediate impact on the percentage of insurgents being released prematurely without undermining our commitment to the rule of law. It is yet another example of the Force's ability to employ organic assets in a creative manner to increase combat effectiveness.

I MEF FWD commanders also responded to the increased burden of proof to convict detainees by creating Sensitive Site Exploitation Teams from organic personnel assets. Units designated a set of Marines who independently developed the skills and expertise to analyze a crime scene and exploit it for evidence in the form of fingerprints, shell casings and other physical evidence. Similar to the Joint Prosecution Exploitation Center, this non-traditional role for combat troops produced a dramatic effect in the rate and length of long-term detentions for captured insurgents.

#### (Air Power)

Despite the inherent difficulties of incorporating aviation operations in a counter-insurgency operation, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing deftly overcame the challenges of a dynamic and ill-defined battlefield through meticulous planning that called for the intelligent application of aviation effects. The innovative solutions developed by 3d Marine Aircraft Wing proved invaluable in ensuring battle space dominance through extensive airborne surveillance, precision aviation fires, and responsive airborne raids.

3d Marine Aircraft Wing, in concert with I MEF FWD staff, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, and 4th Reconnaissance Battalion developed a novel approach to decreasing reaction time for emerging targets through the AeroScout concept. AeroScout missions involved embarking a react force on transport helicopters and flying in formation with an attack helicopter escort that could rapidly deploy ground and airborne forces in response to real time intelligence or immediate threats. The result of this innovative concept was timely responsiveness that increased the presence of coalition forces on the ground without exposing forces to the dangers of movement on the ground.

The true benefit of Marine Aviation was realized in the support of Troops in Contact situations where I MEF FWD Marines and Soldiers were involved in direct contact with the enemy and requested immediate air support to suppress and destroy him. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing answered the call for more than 700 Troops in Contact events, providing timely and effective Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Close Air Support for engaged coalition forces as well as Iraqi Army and Police. In instances where fires would have been detrimental to the counterinsurgency principle of winning hearts and minds, the experienced aviators of 3d Marine Aircraft Wing used their optimized view of the battle space to pinpoint Anti-Iraqi Forces' locations and allow friendly forces to maneuver against, engage, and defeat a cunning enemy.

Movement by air became an essential component of increasing security on the battlefield as every Improvised Explosive Device attack registered a win for the insurgency. In order to move the maximum amount of personnel and cargo with limited resources, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing continually refined the Ring Route system, which effectively operated as a helicopter airline service. This preplanned helicopter routing allowed units to submit movement requests to coincide with established times and routings, vastly reducing the manpower required to plan helicopter flights and improving the efficiency and utilization of limited assets. This unique and innovative approach was the primary tool that enabled the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing to airlift more than 90 million pounds of cargo and more than 250,000 passengers.

Other dramatic enhancements to the use of aviation in a counterinsurgency environment occurred in the realm of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Through the use of both manned and unmanned air assets, ground commanders were provided with the most thorough view of their battle space in the history of warfare. Fixed wing aircraft employed their "LITening pod" targeting cameras in new and increasingly effective ways to include the use of "rover" transponders which allowed forward air controllers to have an eagle's eye view of the battlefield whether in a combat operations center or forward deployed

with troops in the field. These effective new surveillance capabilities aided commanders not only with targeting but with improvised explosive device interdiction and over watch for combat patrols.

Through aggressive technological development, initiation of new concepts in aviation support, creative use of forces, and a constant willingness to explore new frontiers where conventional solutions would not suffice, I MEF FWD put the insurgency on the defensive for the first time in the war.

#### EFFECTIVENESS OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCE TRANSITION

I MEF FWD initiated an aggressive plan to grow police forces in Al Anbar based on the goals and objectives outlined in the theater commander's "2006 Year of the Police" campaign plan. The IP force grew from approximately 2143 assigned plus an additional 1599 in training to 10251 assigned plus including 837 in training. The number of functioning police districts grew from three to the full ten Iraqi Police Districts assigned within Al Anbar and the number of active police stations grew from 14 to 40. With this increase in force and capability, the Iraqi Police force is far more effective, routinely conducting joint operations with Iraqi Army in many areas, and combined operations with Coalition Forces across Al Anbar, and is routinely detaining criminals and insurgents. The Iraqi Police have also developed enough in some areas that they are now able to operate by themselves in conducting security operations and arresting criminals and insurgents. The increasing strength of the Iraqi Police paid increasing dividends in intelligence as their knowledge of the local civilian populace provided knowledge critical to winning a counterinsurgency operation.

The Provincial Police Headquarters was ineffective and inoperative upon the arrival of I MEF FWD due to heightened danger at the Government Center where the headquarters was located; Iraqi Police were not reporting for duty out of fear for their safety in simply traveling to work. I MEF FWD mitigated the impacts of this danger by establishing a temporary Headquarters location on Camp Blue Diamond. I MEF FWD also augmented the current US Army transition team with out-of-hide Marines from the MEF FWD Staff as well as five Marines from 1st Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment. These actions brought the Provincial HQ attendance from 5 to 60 Iraqi Police per day. With increased safety and attendance, the Provincial HQ became involved in police activities across the Province. The Provincial HQ is now heavily involved in its own pay and finances as well as its own operations, including security at the Government Center alongside Marines. The initiative of I MEF FWD in researching and procuring a satellite communication system for the Provincial Headquarters was another significant progress enabler. The resultant ability to communicate across the vast distances of Al Anbar Province allowed for regular reporting and coordination throughout every district in the Province.

At the outset of OIF 05-07, all efforts to recruit and retain police were compromised by the fact that Iraqi Police were not being paid and therefore not working. Through the concerted efforts of I MEF FWD, officials at all levels of the government, and the Anbar Police Force, the Iraqi Police have been paid on time every month since June 2006. This consistency and assurance had a huge and immediate effect on recruiting and retention of the Iraqi Police.

Similar to the pay problem, the lack of equipment and weapons created a heavy burden on the success of the Iraqi Police. After several months of coordination and work with the Provincial HQ, Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT), Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MCSTC-I), and the Iraqi Ministry Of the Interior, I MEF FWD coordinated the restarting of equipment distribution eventually providing 8243 AK-47s, 4680 pistols, millions of rounds of ammunition, 6052 ballistic vests with SAPI plates, over 14 thousand uniforms, and 905 police vehicles. This equipment was crucial to the operational capability of the Iraqi Police.

The lack of a formal training Academy in Al Anbar posed numerous challenges to Multi-National Forces - West as it struggled to develop a professional police force. During its tenure, I MEF FWD coordinated monthly to send recruits to academies outside the province. Because these academies provided minimal training, I MEF FWD used its own resources to create training programs to supplement these schools, greatly improving the capabilities and professionalism of Iraqi Police in Al Anbar. These programs included the use of the Phoenix Academy in Taji for weapons and security training, and Iraqi Police

Leadership School in Al Qaim for officers and noncommissioned officers, and enhanced marksmanship courses in Fallujah, Hit, and Al Qaim. These formal courses supplemented the day to day mentoring and teaching provided by the Police Transition Teams. In addition to finding training resources outside the province, the Force laid the groundwork for the establishment of an Al Anbar Police Academy at Habbaniyah that will open for training in June 2007.

Each of these accomplishments was made possible by resourceful manning of Police Transition Teams. I MEF FWD provided 16 out of 30 Police Transition Teams in order to provide the oversight and mentorship necessary to ensure the success and development of the Iraqi Police. When the full complement of PTTs that were to be provided by the US Army Military Police Brigade was redirected to Baghdad, the Force stretched itself and adapted to meet this crucial need. I MEF FWD showed its innovation when creating this capability by recruiting reservists with civilian police experience in a myriad of disciplines from administration to weapons training, tactical operations to maintenance planning, and logistical organization to Special Weapons And Tactics. Many of these law enforcement experts came from Selected Marine Corps Reserve Units assigned to the Force, such as the 1st and 3d Battalion of the 14th Marines (employed as a provisional military police battalion) and 1st Battalion, 24th Marines (assigned to the critical Fallujah battle space).

(Iraqi Army Improvements)

When I MEF FWD took command in February of 2006, the newly established 1st and 7th Iraqi Army Divisions were operating with 12 of 30 Headquarters at Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) level 2. The transition readiness assessment measures the ability of all Iraqi Security Force elements to be able to take over battle space from the coalition forces. Through 12 months of dedicated effort, I MEF FWD increased that number to 21 of 30 Headquarters operating at level 2. Additionally, 21 units assumed independent battle space at the battalion, brigade, and division echelons. Both Divisions stood up Motor Transport Regiments, Military Police Companies, and Bomb Disposal Companies. Throughout its tenure as Multi National Force-West, I MEF FWD steadily transitioned to Iraq Army Lead.

Efforts to improve the readiness level of the Iraqi Army were hindered by three major impediments that resulted in a significant manning shortfall. First and foremost, the National Army Recruiting Centers went into force sustainment mode prior to completing initial force generation for 1st and 7th Divisions. Secondly, the 1st Division had more than 2200 "ghost" soldiers that masked the true shortages afflicting the division and made it appear as if the division had most of its required soldiers. Thirdly, the failure of the Iraqi Army support structure to eliminate pay and life support problems caused a significant number of soldiers to leave. I MEF FWD aggressively attacked the problem by enforcing strict accountability among Iraqi troops to identify ghost soldiers and by conducting seven recruiting drives in Al Anbar. To overcome a horrifically low literacy rate in Al Anbar, I MEF FWD created a literacy program to qualify illiterate recruits for service in the Iraqi Army. To rectify the pay and life support issues that plagued the Iraqi Army, I MEF FWD engaged the support structure to increase discipline and accountability in Iraqi Army administration and logistical systems. These efforts significantly slowed the desertion rate of Iraqi Soldiers and slowly reversed the tide on the manning situation in Al Anbar. The Force also improved equipment readiness through the distribution of 324 Up Armored High Mobility Multi Purpose Wheeled Vehicles, the installation of up-armor protection on 188 Ashok Leyland trucks, the addition of 225 Mobile Tracking Systems, and the distribution of 232, 12.7 mm machine guns to the Iraqi Army. As a result of this Herculean effort, I MEF FWD (Spell out) succeeded in preparing the Iraqi Divisions for assuming the lead. As of February 2007, 1st Iraqi Army Division had assumed command and control of three of its four brigades.

(Border/POE Improvement)

The Iraqi Security Force transition staff of I MEF FWD and its nine Border Transition Teams including two Port of Entry Transition Teams played a vital role in the organization, training, and equipping of 1400 Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement Police. Due to the effective training and mentoring of I MEF FWD Border Transition Teams, Iraqi Border Police were prepared to operate independently along the vast majority of Iraq's vast western boarder by February 2007.

One of the main limitations on the ability of the Ports of Entry at Waleed (Syrian Border) and Trebil (Jordanian Border) to control traffic in and out of Iraq were poorly designed facilities inadequate to the task of effectively screening the huge number of people and vehicles that passed through daily. This shortcoming undermined their ability to prevent the infiltration of people, weapons and funds to support the insurgency. In an extremely short period of time, the 15th MEU SOC made significant contributions to the Waleed Port of Entry on the Syrian Border and the Trebil Port of Entry on the Jordanian Border. Combat Logistics Battalion 15 (CLB-15) established itself quickly and performed a number of projects intended to enhance security, quality of life and assist in creating a system by which the flow of traffic going in and out of Iraq could be more efficient. In addition to the force protection improvements that made a more secure working environment, one of the single most significant projects that was completed during this period was the re-vamping of the truck inspection system. In order to overhaul the inefficient and unsecured single-lane system at Waleed, CLB-15 built a truck inspection lot where four trucks could be inspected concurrently in inspection bays with raised platforms that afforded the inspectors the opportunity to walk the length of the truck, looking down into the cargo hold. By providing these raised catwalks for the inspectors to search, the process not only became much more efficient, but also much more secure. With the export of oil about to begin through the port of entry at Trebil, segregation of trucks with potentially flammable cargo was a major concern. CLB-15 constructed four, 75-meter inspections lanes separated by blast walls in order to reduce security threats to this critical oil exportation system. These physical improvements to the ports of entry have had and will continue to have important impacts to the physical security of Iraq, giving Department of Border Enforcement Police and their counterparts a far more effective environment to search the cargo that moves in and out of the country each day, and denying the insurgents the ability to move contraband, weapons, and personnel into the country.

A third port of entry at Al Qaim is scheduled to reopen in April 2007 due to the efforts of planners from I MEF FWD in conjunction with coalition forces and local leaders in the Al Qaim region. The opening of this port, after having been closed for two years due to security issues, will contribute immeasurably to economic development in the Al Qaim region and Al Anbar Province as a whole.

#### IMPACTS ON ENEMY/SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS

Throughout the course of its tour, I MEF FWD put forth a valiant effort in neutralizing Iraq's cunning insurgent enemy. Understanding that the loss of any innocent life was detrimental to the strategic mission in Iraq, the men and women of I MEF FWD used every capability available to capture insurgents for intelligence exploitation. Where capture was not an option, deadly force was used to eliminate threats. Constant vigilance and increased presence across the Area of Operations resulted in the capture of 6600 insurgents and the killing of 2000. Using advanced technology and maintaining a heightened awareness, I MEF FWD decreased the threat to Coalition Forces through discovery and disarming of more than 2,600 improvised explosive devices. Additionally, more than 700 weapons caches were discovered, effectively reducing the resources available to the enemy to prosecute attacks against coalition and Iraqi Forces.

#### ECONOMY AND CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

As the maneuver elements and transition teams of I MEF FWD were bolstering security and the readiness of Iraqi Security Forces, planners, members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team and civil affairs teams worked to facilitate the development of the provincial government and the eventual return to Iraqi control of Al Anbar Province. A plan called Al Anbar Consolidation was developed as a comprehensive multi-year plan incorporating security and economic development initiatives to support the stabilization of Iraq. The economic development aspect of this program involved agricultural development, business development, telecommunication development, sewer/water/electric/trash essential service (SWET) development, and Iraqi Railroad development. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 05-07 the Iraqi Railroad increased its access to rails in the area of operations from 10 percent of available track to more than 80 percent and worked toward rail connectivity between Al Qaim and Baghdad for the first time since March of 2003. In January of 2007, I MEF FWD led the way in executing the first ever economic conference in Dubai. This conference capitalized on business relationships that had been established through a series of meetings during May through August of 2006 in Amman Jordan and planted the seed for future investment in the economy of the Anbar Province.

The 3d and 4th Civil Affairs groups played a vital role in revitalizing the quality of life, infrastructure and economic potential of communities across Al Anbar during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 05-07 while simultaneously helping commanders tactically by working to improve relations with local nationals. Reserve Marines from both Civil Affairs Groups contributed across the array of Civil-Military Operations functions, often bringing essential skills from their civilian occupations to the task. They played a central role in the development of local governance across the province, helping to engage city councils in Fallujah, Karma, Saqlaweyah; meeting with sheiks in Ramadi and Fallujah and interacting with citizen advisory councils across the province. They also supported the growth of the provincial government through their Government Support Team and its aid to the Provisional Reconstruction Team and Governor Ma'Moon.

Civil Affairs Marines also helped to provide both short-term relief and long-term stimulation to the economy of Al Anbar. They stepped in countless times to meet the needs of ordinary Iraqis by distributing critical relief supplies such as clothing, blankets, heaters and generators. Whether in response to coalition operations such as those in Ramadi, ongoing hardships across the province or unplanned contingencies such as the arrival of refugees from strife in Baghdad, civil affairs relief efforts mitigated economic hardship and helped to build bridges with local nationals. Civil affairs teams had an equally significant impact on the long-term economic prospects of the province through their support of projects such as the Iraqi Railroad in Al Anbar, water pumping stations, sewer systems, power distribution, road reconstruction and municipal buildings.

One of the greatest long-term effects of civil-military operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 05-07 will likely be the support provided to Iraqi schools and school-aged children. From the distribution of 30,000 backpacks filled with school supplies to projects renovating 33 schools at a total cost of \$1.4 million, this effort will have a profound impact on education and young Iraqis across the province. As coalition forces strive to improve future conditions in Iraq, these investments in the nation's next generation will have enduring effects. Civil affairs teams also helped to maintain relations with the current generation of Iraqis through their role in the claims process. These teams provided an efficient means for Iraqi citizens to apply for relief from the effects of coalition activities at Civil Military Operations Centers across the province. In total more than 1,000 claims were paid out for damages caused by Coalition Forces. These payments helped to maintain positive relations with local nationals.

## CONCLUSION

The achievements of the I MEF FWD during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 05-07 have been extraordinary. Throughout a year of dangerous, demanding and complex missions, the Marines, Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of I MEF FWD demonstrated exceptional valor on a daily basis. Their courage, selflessness, wisdom and restraint set a new standard for heroism on the modern counterinsurgency battlefield. Their actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The achievements of the I MEF FWD during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 05-07 have been extraordinary. At the onset of their tour, they were the main effort of the war in Iraq, tasked with defeating the vanguard of Iraq's insurgency in the largest and deadliest province in the nation. Just weeks into their campaign, the bombing of the Samarra mosque and the ensuing ethnic violence created a massive shift in resources. Operations in the Anbar Province became a supporting effort while forces and attention swung to Baghdad. The sectarian strife in Baghdad and elsewhere made the mission of Multi-National Forces – West more difficult as cooperation, support and attention from Iraqi ministries in the Shia-controlled national government all declined. I MEF FWD was asked to do more with less – a task they carried out with perseverance, professionalism, and daily acts of courage.

The cornerstone of their success was the concept of "clear, hold, build" that was employed in at least nine

critical cities throughout the sprawling Province. In spite of the danger, I MEF FWD moved into key terrain to deny insurgents movement on the battlefield and the ability to gain significant footholds. The combination of daring decisions and innovative solutions to battle field obstacles resulted in a shift in dynamics that put the enemy on the defensive and increased the stability of the Anbar Province. Innovations in the employment of aviation assets saved lives and added a dimension to combat in the Anbar Province that the enemy had no means to counter. Applied technology and persistence allowed for safer convoys, more improvised explosive device discoveries than actual attacks, and greater control over the populations in cities that had been cleared and bermed. As these actions were increasing the security of critical locations throughout the Province, I MEF FWD continued to plus up transition teams in order to provide expertise to the Iraqi Security Forces, which hold the key to long-term security in Iraq. Reaching from within existing manpower structure, I MEF FWD sourced an inordinate amount of additional transition teams. Personnel across the Force stepped out of their traditional roles to effect greater security in Iraq by filling a variety of billets on extremely short notice.

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) is not currently pending any on-going investigations.

The impacts of the valorous actions of I MEF FWD from February 2006 to February 2007 are encapsulated in the following statistics:

Enemy Killed - 2000  
Enemy Captured - 6600  
Friendly Killed - 308  
Friendly Wounded - 3134  
Wounded Return to Duty Rate - 76%

Improvised Explosive Device Attacks - 2,606  
Improvised Explosive Device Discoveries - 2,646  
Vehicle-born Improvised Explosive Device Attacks - 18  
Small Arms Fire Attacks - 3,436  
Indirect Fire Attacks - 1,773  
Weapons Caches Discoveries - 746  
Complex Attacks - 313  
Mine Strikes - 75  
Missions executed against Al Qaeda Targets - 500  
Mission executed against other insurgent/criminal Targets - 1000

Awards (as of date of submission)

Combat Actions Ribbons - 6998 (4,036 Pending)  
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal with Combat Distinguishing Device - 967 (113 pending)  
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with Combat Distinguishing Device - 414 (142 pending)  
Bronze Star with Combat Distinguishing Device - 77 (128 pending)  
Legion of Merit with Combat Distinguishing Device - 1 (1 pending)

During the course of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 05-07 the forces serving in the Anbar province made a dramatic impact on the security, stability and future prospects of their vast area of operations. By tenaciously and effectively applying and improving the tenets of counterinsurgency warfare, I MEF FWD had powerful effects on the insurgency in the Anbar province while simultaneously making unprecedented improvements in the size, capabilities and readiness of Iraqi Security forces. Concurrently, commanders re-cultivated effective relations with sheiks and other local leaders across the province, paving the way for security force recruitment, transition to local governance and economic growth. These enhancements to stability and security coupled with foundation-building for civic progress have effectively built a bridge between Anbar's chaotic past and a more hopeful future. Throughout a year of dangerous, demanding and complex missions, the Marines, Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of I MEF FWD demonstrated exceptional valor on a daily basis. Their courage, selflessness, wisdom and restraint set a new standard for heroism on the modern counterinsurgency battlefield. Their actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

**Archived Unit Awards**

| <u>Unit</u>   | <u>Approved Award</u> | <u>Originator</u>   | <u>Inclusive Dates</u>              |
|---|-----------------------|---|-------------------------------------|
| <u>1st Battalion, 3d Marines</u>                    | NUC                   | Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command                          | 26 December 2005 to 31 May 2006     |
| <u>1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING</u>                     | MUC                   | COMMANDING GENERAL, III MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE                            | August 2000 to May 2002             |
| <u>1stBn6thMar</u>                                  | ZZ-No Award           | Commanding Officer, 4th Marines   | 5 JUN 2002/5 Dec 2002               |
| <u>2D BATTALION, 8TH MARINES (REIN)</u>             | NUC                   | Commanding Officer, 6th Marine Regiment                                       | 25 September 2003 to 31 May 2004    |
| <u>2D DEN BN/NAVDENCEN</u>                          | MU                    | Commanding General, 2d Force Service Support Group                            | June 1998 - December 2000           |
| <u>2d Force Recon CO</u>                            | MUC                   | Commanding Officer, Headquarters Group, II Marine Expeditionary Force         | 20020709 - 20040709                 |
| <u>2d FSSG</u>                                      | NUC                   | Commander, Marine Forces Central Command                                      | 15 Dec 2001 - 1 June 2003           |
| <u>2d MainBn</u>                                    | MU                    | Commanding General, 2d Force Service Support Group                            | 1 January 2000 - 1 June 2001        |
| <u>3D Assault Amphibian Battalion</u>               | MUC                   | Commanding General, 1st Marine Division                                       | 20030515 to 20041031.               |
| <u>3d Battalion, 6th Marines</u>                    | NUC                   | COMUSMARCENT, 7115 South Boundary Blvd, MacDill AFB FL 33621                  | a. 18 April 2004 - 21 November 2004 |
| <u>3D DENBN</u>                                     | MU                    | COMMANDER, 3D FORCE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP                                     | JULY 1998 - JULY 2001               |
| <u>3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines</u>                   | MUC                   | Officer-in-Charge, MARCENT Coordination Element - Afghanistan                 | 25 November 2004 - 15 June 2005     |
| <u>3rd Bn, 8th Mar (Anti-Terrorism Battalion)</u>   | MUC                   | Commanding General, 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism), II MEF | 20011029-20020902                   |
| <u>4th ANGLICO</u>                                  | MUC                   | Commander, Marine Forces Reserve  | 28 November 1999 to 29 April 2002   |
| <u>4th ANGLICO, Det C</u>                           | NUC                   | Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command                          | 1 APRIL 2004 - 5 NOVEMBER 2004      |
| <u>4th Civil Affairs Group</u>                      | NUC                   | Commanding General, 4th Force Service Support Group                           | January 1997-November 2001.         |
| <u>4thANGLICODetDelta</u>                           |                       | Officer in Charge, Detachment Delta, 4th ANGLICO                              | 1 Oct 2004 - 1 June 2005            |
| <u>4thANGLICODetDelta</u>                           |                       | Officer in Charge, Detachment Delta, 4th ANGLICO                              | 1 Oct 2004 - 1 June 2005            |
| <u>4thANGLICODetDelta</u>                           |                       | Officer in Charge, Detachment Delta, 4th ANGLICO                              | 1 Oct 2004 - 1 June 2005            |
| <u>4thANGLICODetDelta</u>                           |                       | Officer in Charge, Detachment Delta, 4th ANGLICO                              | 1 Oct 2004 - 1 June 2005            |
| <u>4thANGLICODetDelta</u>                           |                       | Officer in Charge, Detachment Delta, 4th ANGLICO                              | 1 Oct 2004 - 1 June 2005            |
| <u>4thANGLICODetDelta</u>                           |                       | Officer in Charge, Detachment Delta, 4th ANGLICO                              | 1 Oct 2004 - 1 June 2005            |
| <u>4thANGLICODetDelta</u>                           |                       | Officer in Charge, Detachment Delta, 4th ANGLICO                              | 1 Oct 2004 - 1 June 2005            |
| <u>4thANGLICODetDelta</u>                           |                       | Officer in Charge, Detachment Delta, 4th ANGLICO                              | 1 Oct 2004 - 1 June 2005            |
| <u>4thANGLICODetDelta</u>                           |                       | Officer in Charge, Detachment Delta, 4th ANGLICO                              | 1 Oct 2004 - 1 June 2005            |
| <u>9th Engineer Bn, 3d FSSG</u>                     | MU                    | Commanding General, 3d Force Service Support Group                            | 000101 - 011231                     |
| <u>Bridge Company Bravo</u>                         | MUC                   | Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command                          | 05 Jan 04 - 21 Sep 04               |
| <u>CAMP LEMONIER</u>                                | NUC                   | COMUSMARCENT, 7115 South Boundary Blvd., MacDill AFB, Tampa, FL 33261-5101    | JULY 2003 - MAY 2005                |
| <u>CBIRF, 4TH MEB (AT)</u>                          | MUC                   | Commanding General, 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism)         | 011021-020201                       |
| <u>CBIRF, 4TH MEB (AT)</u>                          | ZZ-No Award           | Commanding General, 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (AT)                     | 040202-040208                       |
| <u>DET 1 COMM Co, PERU, IN</u>                      | CT                    | HQSVCBN, 4TH FSSG, 1210 NAVAL FORCES CT, BLDG 440, MARIETTA, GA 30069-5021    | 01 January 1999 to 20 February 2001 |
| <u>Field Medical Service School, Camp Pendleton</u> | MU                    | Commanding General, Training Command, 3300 Russell Rd, Quantico, VA           | 11 May 98-30 Apr 02                 |
| <u>HMLA 351</u>                                     | MUC                   | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 36                                  | 1 May 2000 to 1 June 2001           |
| <u>HMLA-267</u>                                     | CT                    | Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing                                   | July 1999 - July 2000               |



|  |               |  |                                       |
|--|---------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| <u>HMLA-773 (-) REIN</u>                             | NUC           | U. S. Marine Forces, Central Command   | OCT 03 - MAY 05                       |
| <u>HMLA-773 (-) REIN</u>                             |               | U. S. Marine Forces, Central Command   | OCT 03 - MAY 05                       |
| <u>HMLA-773 (-) REIN</u>                             | NUC           | U. S. Marine Forces, Central Command   | OCT 03 - MAY 05                       |
| <u>HMM-364</u>                                       | ZZ - No Award | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 39   | 20010501-20020501                     |
| <u>HMM 161</u>                                       | MU            | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 16   | 20000501-20010430                     |
| <u>HMMT-164, MAG-39</u>                              | ZZ-No Award   | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 39   | 20030206-20031001                     |
| <u>HMM(T)-164</u>                                    | MU            | Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing  | 1 October 1998 - 30 September 1999.   |
| <u>HMT-309</u>                                       | MUC           | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 39   | 1 Oct 00 30 Sep 01                    |
| <u>HMX-1</u>   | MUC           | Deputy Commandant for the Department of Aviation, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps                | 1 September 2001 to 5 November 2002   |
| <u>HQBN, HQMC, HENDERSON HALL</u>                    | MUC           | Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters Marine Corps, Henderson Hall            | 01 May 00 - 30 Nov 01                 |
| <u>HQMC, I</u>                                       | ZZ-No Award   | Director, Logistics Plans, Operations and Strategic Mobility Division, IMA Det, I&L Dept., HQMC, | 1 January 2003 - 31 December 2003     |
| <u>HQSVCBN MARFORPAC</u>                             | MU            | Commander, Marine Forces Pacific   | 07/01/99 -07/31/01                    |
| <u>I Marine Expeditionary Force (REIN)</u>           | PUC           | Commander, Marine Corps Forces Pacific   | 21 March-24 April 2003                |
| <u>I MEF</u>   | NUC           | Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command  | 20040802-20050201                     |
| <u>I MEF FWD</u>                                     | NUC           | COMUSMARCENT   | 28 FEB 06 - 9 FEB 07                  |
| <u>I MEF Mojave Viper Support Detachment</u>         | MUC           | Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force   | 1 OCT 05-30 SEP 06                    |
| <u>I MEF Mojave Viper Support Detachment</u>         | MUC           | Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force   | 1 OCT 05-30 SEP 06                    |
| <u>I MEF Mojave Viper Support Detachment</u>         | MUC           | Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force   | 1 OCT 05-30 SEP 06                    |
| <u>I MEF Mojave Viper Support Detachment</u>         | MUC           | Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force   | 1 OCT 05-30 SEP 06                    |
| <u>I MEF (REAR)</u>                                  | NUC           | COMMANDER, MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFIC  | 20030321-20030501                     |
| <u>II MEF, CE</u>                                    | MUC           | COMMARFORCOM   | 20040101 - 20051231                   |
| <u>II MEF, CE</u>                                    | MUC           | COMMARFORCOM   | 20040101 - 20051231                   |
| <u>III MEF</u>                                       | MUC           | Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific   | 12/28/04 -02/12/05                    |
| <u>III MEF</u>                                       | MUC           | Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific   | 12/28/04 -02/12/05                    |
| <u>III MEF/MCB Japan</u>                             | NUC           | Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific   | 20010911-20030531                     |
| <u>MAG-13</u>  | NU            | Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing  | 1 July 1999 - 30 June 2000            |
| <u>MAG-41</u>  | MUC           | Commanding General, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing   | 1 Sep 1999 - 1 Jun 2001               |
| <u>MAG 12</u>  | MU            | Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing   | 1 July 1999 - 30 June 2000            |
| <u>MAGTF-8</u>                                       | NUC           | Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force  | 29 Feb 04 - 30 Jun 04                 |
| <u>MALS-16</u>                                       | MU            | Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing  | 1 May 1998 - 30 September 1999.       |
| <u>Marine Air Control Squadron 2</u>                 | MUC           | Commanding Officer, Marine Air Control Group 28, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing                         | 30 Jun 2001 - 30 Jun 2003             |
| <u>Marine Air Control Squadron 24</u>                | ZZ-No Award   | Marine Air Control Group 48, 2205 Depot Drive Bldg 3200 Suite 200, Great Lakes IL 60088          | 1 January 2001-17 May 2002            |
| <u>Marine Aircraft Group 31</u>                      | MUC           | Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing  | 1 September 2001 to 1 August 2004     |
| <u>Marine Aviation Detachment, NAS, Patuxent Riv</u> | ZZ-No Award   | Deputy Commandant for Aviation, HQMC   | 19980901-20050901                     |
| <u>Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 14</u>         | NUC           | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 14   | 20020301-20030631                     |
| <u>Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 31, MAG-31</u> | CMC Certcom   | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31   | August 2001 - February 2003           |
| <u>Marine Barracks Washington DC</u>                 | NU            | Director, Marine Corps Staff, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps                                    | 18 September 2000 - 23 September 2002 |
| <u>Marine Corps Intelligence Activity</u>            | MU            | DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS                               | 18 SEPTEMBER 2001 - 21 FEBRUARY 2002  |
| <u>Marine Corps Air Facility, Kaneohe Bay, HI</u>    | CT            | Commanding General, Marine Corps Base Hawaii   | 990501 - 010501                       |
| <u>Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry</u>              | MUC           | Deputy Commandant, Installations And Logistics   | Oct 2001 - Sep 2002                   |

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| <u>Point North</u>                                    |             |   |                                      |
| <u>MARINE CORPS BASE QUANTICO</u>                     | LOC         | Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command                         | 990801 - 020731                      |
| <u>Marine Corps Detachment, NMITC</u>                 | ZZ-No Award | Commanding General, Training Command, MCCDC Quantico, VA. 22134                     | 1 Aug 2002 - 31 Dec 2005             |
| <u>MARINE CORPS RECRUITING COMMAND</u>                | MUC         | Commandant of the Marine Corps  | 1 Oct 2000 to 30 Sept 2002           |
| <u>Marine Corps Recruiting Command</u>                | -           | Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps  | 1 Oct 2004 - 30 Sep 2006             |
| <u>Marine Corps Systems Command</u>                   | MUC         | Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps  | August 2002 - April 2003             |
| <u>Marine Corps Tactical System Support Activity</u>  | MUC         | CG, Marine Corps System Command   | 01 JULY 1999 - 01 DEC 2002           |
| <u>Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion</u>           | MUC         | Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity                              | 20020501-20040401                    |
| <u>Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 101</u>    | MU          | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 11  | 20000601-20020517                    |
| <u>Marine Forces, Central Command, Camp Lemonnier</u> | MUC         | Commander, U. S. Marine Forces, Central Command                                     | 1 June 2005 to 1 July 2006           |
| <u>Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465</u>           | MUC         | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 16  | August 2000-January 2002             |
| <u>MARINE SUPPORT BATTALION, FT. MEADE, MD</u>        | MU          | Director, Intelligence Department, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps                  | 1 JUNE 2000 - 1 MAY 2002             |
| <u>Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 3</u>  | MUC         | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 14  | 20000301-20021010                    |
| <u>MARINE WING SUPPORT GROUP 17</u>                   | MU          | COMMANDING GENERAL, 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  | 01 December 2000-31 May 2002         |
| <u>MCAS YUMA, ARIZONA</u>                             | MUC         | Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics                                   | 1 Oct 04 - 30 Sep 05                 |
| <u>MCAS, Miramar, CA</u>                              | MUC         | Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics                                   | 1 Oct 02 - 30 Sep 03                 |
| <u>MCB Camp Lejeune, North Carolina</u>               |             | Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics                                   | 1 Oct 03 - 30 Sep 04                 |
| <u>MCB Camp Lejeune, North Carolina</u>               | MUC         | Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics                                   | 1 Oct 03 - 30 Sep 04                 |
| <u>MCB Camp Pendleton, CA</u>                         | MU          | Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics                                      | Oct 2000 - Sep 2001                  |
| <u>MCB, CAMP PENDLETON</u>                            | MUC         | Commander, U. S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific                                       | OCT 2001 - DEC 2003                  |
| <u>MCIA, QUANTICO</u>                                 | NUC         | Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps                           | 1 Mar 02 - 1 Sep 03                  |
| <u>MCLB Band, Albany, GA</u>                          | ZZ-No Award | Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battalion, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA | 1 August 2000 to 31 December 2002    |
| <u>MCOTEA</u>   | MU          | Director, Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity                     | 15 September 1998 to 01 October 2000 |
| <u>MCRD PISC</u>                                      | MU          | COMMANDING GENERAL, TRAINING AND EDUCATION COMMAND                                  | 199901-200012                        |
| <u>MCSOCOM Det One</u>                                | NUC         | Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific   | 19 Apr 04 - 3 Mar 06                 |
| <u>MPE, SPMAGTF, KUWAIT</u>                           | MUC         | Commanding General, Marine Forces Central Command                                   | 15 JUNE 2003-10 NOVEMBER 2003        |
| <u>MTU-17 New York</u>                                | LOC         | Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company, Marine Corps Reserve Support Command      | Oct 1998-May 2002                    |
| <u>MWHS-2, 20MAW</u>                                  | MUC         | Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing   | 1 Aug 2002 - 30 Mar 2004             |
| <u>MWSS371</u>  | MUC         | Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Support Group 37                                    | 1 JAN 99 - 31 MAY 02                 |
| <u>NAVAL DENTAL CENTER, PARRIS ISLAND</u>             | MUC         | Commanding Officer, Naval Dental Center, Parris Island, SC                          | 20021001 - 20031231                  |
| <u>Naval Hospital Twentynine Palms</u>                | MUC         | CG, MCAGCC, Twentynine Palms  | 9 Nov 2000 - 21 Nov 2003             |
| <u>Provost Marshal's Office, MAGTF, MCAGCC</u>        | MUC         | Chief of Staff, MAGTF, MCAGCC, Box 788100, Twentynine Palms, CA 92278-8100          | 000101-010630                        |
| <u>QUANTICO MARINE BAND</u>                           | MUC         | COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS BASE, QUANTICO                                     | 19960701-20010830                    |
| <u>SOLEAST AND WEST</u>                               | MUC         | COMMANDING GENERAL, TRAINING COMMAND  | 20010601 to 20040601                 |
| <u>USMARCENT</u>                                      | NUC         | Commandant of the Marine Corps  | 15 OCTOBER 2001 TO 5 JUNE 2003       |
| <u>USNH OKI JA</u>                                    | MU          | Deputy Commander, Marine Corps Bases Japan  | 1 January 2000 - 31 December 2000    |
| <u>YMAQ-2</u>   | MUC         | COMUSMARCENT  | 20040602-20050129                    |
| <u>YMAT203</u>  | MUC         | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 14  | 20010901-20020930                    |
| <u>YMFA-121</u>                                       | MUC         | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 11  | 011001 TO 021001                     |

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| <u>VMFA(AW)-121</u>               | MU            | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 11 | 000608-010430                 |
| <u>VMFA(AW)-225</u>               | MU            | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 11 | 01 March 2000 to 13 June 2001 |
| <u>VMFA(AW)-242</u>               | CT            | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 12 | 20010310 - 20011004           |
| <u>VMFA(AW)-332</u>               |               | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 | 01 May 2005 to 31 March 2007  |
| <u>VMFA(AW)-332</u>               |               | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 | 01 May 2005 to 31 March 2007  |
| <u>VMFA(AW)-332</u>               |               | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 | 01 May 2005 to 31 March 2007  |
| <u>VMFA(AW)-533</u>               | MU            | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 12 | 20010116 - 20010710           |
| <u>VMFA(AW)-121, MAG-11, 3MAW</u> | ZZ - No Award | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 11 | 05 Mar 2000 - 07 Jun 2000     |
| <u>VMGR-152</u>                   | MUC           | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 36 | 1 May 1998 - 31 June 2000     |
| <u>VMGR-352, MAG-11</u>           | MUC           | Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 11 | 970701-020502                 |
| <u>VMX-22</u>                     | MUC           | VMX-22                                       | 28 AUG 2003 TO 16 JUNE 2005   |
| <u>WTBN</u>                       | MUC           | Commanding General, Training Command         | 19960101 to 20011231          |